From AIAA’s “Daily Launch” email newsletter for Monday, 6-23-2025. This ship was intended for Flight Test 10. It blew up before they ever ignited the engines. Quote:
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SpaceX
traces Starship test-stand explosion to failure of pressurized nitrogen tank
By Mike
Wall published 3 days ago (on Space.com)
"Initial analysis indicates the
potential failure of a pressurized tank known as a COPV."
SpaceX thinks it knows why its newest
Starship spacecraft went boom this week.
The 171-foot-tall (52-meter-tall)
vehicle exploded
on a test stand at SpaceX's Starbase site late
Wednesday night (June 18) as the company was preparing to ignite its six Raptor
engines in a "static fire" trial.
A day later, SpaceX narrowed
in on a likely cause.
"Initial analysis indicates the
potential failure of a pressurized tank known as a COPV, or composite
overwrapped pressure vessel, containing gaseous nitrogen in Starship's nosecone
area, but the full data review is ongoing," the company wrote in an update on Thursday (June
19).
"There is no commonality between
the COPVs used on Starship and SpaceX's Falcon rockets," the company
added. So, launches of the workhorse Falcon 9,
which has already flown 75 times in 2025, should not be affected.
The Starship explosion did not cause
any reported injuries; all SpaceX personnel at Starbase are safe, according to
the update. People living around the site, which is near the border city of
Brownsville, shouldn't be worried about contamination from the incident, SpaceX
said.
"Previous independent tests conducted
on materials inside Starship, including toxicity analyses, confirm they pose no
chemical, biological, or toxicological risks," the company wrote.
"SpaceX is coordinating with local, state, and federal agencies, as
appropriate, on matters concerning environmental and safety impacts."
That said, the explosion did damage
the area around the test stand, which is at Starbase's Massey site (not the
orbital launch mount area, from which Starship lifts off).
"The explosion ignited several
fires at the test site which remains clear of personnel and will be assessed
once it has been determined to be safe to approach," SpaceX wrote in the
update. "Individuals should not attempt to approach the area while safing
operations continue."
Wednesday night's explosion occurred
during preparations for Starship's 10th flight test, which SpaceX had hoped to
launch by the end of the month. (Static fires are common prelaunch tests,
performed to ensure that engines are ready to fly.) That timeline will now
shift to the right, though it's not clear at the moment by how much.
The incident was the latest in a
series of setbacks for Starship upper stages. SpaceX lost the vehicle — also
known as Ship — on the last three Starship flight tests, which launched in
January, March and May of this year.
Starship's first stage, called Super Heavy, has a better
track record of late. For example, on Flight
7 and Flight
8, the huge booster successfully
returned to Starbase, where it was caught by the launch tower's
"chopstick" arms as planned.
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My take: if the
description “in the nosecone” for the location of the COPV is correct, then it is located very close to the oxygen
header tank (as the version 1 with 1200 metric tons propellant capacity was
laid out), which is also in the nose of
the vehicle, ahead of the “cargo bay”
area. Such a COPV explosion would easily
rupture that oxygen header tank.
Compressed gases drive great explosive violence (with shrapnel) when
such vessels burst. See Figure 1.
Figure 1 – Inboard Profile of Starship Version 1
There would seem to be an oxygen header tank transfer piping
line down the windward “belly” of the cargo bay section, based on descriptions I have read. In the explosion slow-motion video, the cargo bay splits open through its heat
shield, right where that transfer line
supposedly is, with gush of something
white (not fire) bursting through,
followed immediately by an explosion engulfing about the top half of the
vehicle, and a second or so later by a
second explosion seemingly centered lower down.
The main propellant tanks below the cargo bay would be the
main methane tank forward, with the
methane header tank located inside, at
the base of that tank, and finally the
main oxygen tank, just ahead of the
engine bay. The upgraded version 2 has a
bigger propellant capacity, but should
be laid out similarly.
I would hazard the guess that the COPV explosion and
bursting oxygen header tank somehow put a large force on the transfer
line, which split open the belly at the
cargo bay, allowing liquid (and vapor)
oxygen out through that split, as well
as releasing a few tons of liquid oxygen to fall down on top of the main
methane tank.
My guess is that spilled header oxygen and vented methane
vapors are much of the first explosion.
Bear in mind that the impact of a few tons of liquid oxygen on the top
of the main methane tank would rupture it as well, adding some fuel to that first explosion
pulse. That first explosion pulse would
massively rupture the main methane tank,
and also likely the main oxygen tank below it. That’s the second pulse of the
explosion, which was larger and
longer, reflecting the larger mass of
reactants.
All of that scenario is just an educated guess on my
part.
As for the nitrogen tank,
said to be a “COPV”, or
“composite overwrapped pressure vessel”,
maybe that is not the right choice this early in the flight test
program. Such a design is a metal shell
that is simply too thin to hold the pressure,
overwrapped by a yarn or fabric-reinforced composite material, to bring it up to strength at a lighter
weight.
Here’s the problem:
no composite material has a large plastic (post-yield) strain
capability. If the COPV over-pressures
for any reason whatsoever, failure will
be sudden, without any warning! Maybe a heavier all-metal nitrogen tank, one with much more plastic strain
capability, would be a better choice
until the other bugs all get worked out.
At least you could see it stretch before it explodes. You do not want to fly even
experimentally, with too many possible
failure modes! See Figure 2.
Figure 2 – Stress-Strain Curves for Low and High Plastic
Strain Capability
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